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Wealth, Health, HIV and the Economics of Hope1 
 
Tony Barnett2 and Mark Weston3 
 
Introduction 
The links between health and economics have gained increasing recognition in recent 
years. Public health crises such as SARS (Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome), an easily 
transmissible respiratory infection, and BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), a 
disease associated with systemic failures in the food industry,4 have raised awareness that 
pestilence can hurt pockets.  At the same time, continued and increasing ill health in the 
poorest parts of the world has heightened interest in the poverty-disease nexus among 
international donors, policy-makers, business and civil society.  
The strength of the association between wealth and health is well established in the 
academic literature. People living in countries with higher incomes tend to be healthier and 
have longer life expectancy than those living in poorer regions. Wealth gives people better 
access to better health care, stronger knowledge about healthful and harmful activities, and 
is generally associated with employment that poses fewer risks to mind and body. In a 
widely cited study of the wealth to health link, Pritchett and Summers (1996) found that 
income growth accounted for 40 per cent of differential mortality improvements between 
countries.5 This is not necessarily a continuing positive relationship.  In certain cultural and 
economic settings where food production and consumption become part of the commodity 
economy, there is growing evidence that wealth and greater disposable income can result 
in obesity and other eating-related diseases such as diabetes.6 
More recently, the reverse link – from health to wealth – has also received attention. Good 
health can promote economic development through a number of channels, beginning very 
early in life. Healthy children are better able than their unhealthy peers to attend school and 
to learn effectively while in school. Strong cognitive abilities acquired at school are 
associated with increased productivity as people enter the workforce.7 Healthy adults suffer 
less frequent absences from work, are more productive, and earn higher wages than less 
                                               
1 We are grateful to Tom Coates for his comments and suggestions regarding earlier drafts of this paper. 
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healthy individuals.8 And in old age, the healthy consume fewer public resources and place 
a smaller burden on those of working-age.9   
Calculations by Bloom and Canning (2000) suggest that if two countries are compared 
whose only difference is that one has a five-year advantage in life expectancy (life 
expectancy reflects health status), the healthier country’s economy will grow 0.3-0.5 per 
cent faster.10 The World Health Organisation’s Commission on Macroeconomics and 
Health, meanwhile, argued that, “The burden of disease stands as a stark barrier to 
economic growth and therefore must be addressed frontally and centrally in any 
comprehensive development strategy.”11 
There is no simple relationship between poverty and AIDS12.  Sixty-two per cent of those 
infected with the virus live in the world’s poorest region, Sub-Saharan Africa, which is home 
to only 10 per cent of the world’s population.13 The poor may be more susceptible to HIV 
infection due to lack of education, general poor health and weak access to health services. 
They may also be forced by financial and other pressures into livelihood strategies, for 
example labour migration, which lend themselves to multiple and/or concurrent sexual 
partners.14 Conversely, relative wealth enables men to visit sex workers and makes them 
more mobile (mobility is an important risk factor for HIV). While poverty undoubtedly plays a 
role in transmission and progression of the disease, the causal relationships are complex, 
having to do with social, economic and cultural inequalities as much as with stark 
impoverishment. It is very likely, for example, that circumstances where social and 
economic change is rapid and where societies face times of sharp and extended transition 
(as in the case of Russia and China) constitute risk environments where inequality 
gradients become suddenly steeper.15 Interventions must engage with these complexities.   
HIV/AIDS casts a new light on the importance of the reverse relationship, from health to 
economies. Unlike most infectious diseases, HIV/AIDS primarily affects people of working 
age. It therefore has the potential to erode labour forces, damage businesses and plunge 
families, and even communities, into poverty.  These effects may well truncate people’s 
orientation toward the future, reducing the time perspective within which they operate - in 
other words, reducing hope.    
                                               
8 TP Schultz (2002): Wage Gains Associated with Height as a Form of Human Capital. American Economic 
Review, Papers and Proceedings. May. 
9 For more detailed discussion of the links from health to wealth, see for example DE Bloom and D Canning 
(2003): “The Health and Poverty of Nations: From Theory to Practice,” Journal of Human Development, Vol. 7, 
pp 47-71 
10 DE Bloom, D Canning (2000): The Health and Wealth of Nations. Science, Vol. 287: 1207-1208. 
11 Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (2001): Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for 
Economic Development. 
12 The complexities of this relationship are examined in greater detail in : T.  Barnett, T. and D Topouzis, 
HIV/AIDS and Rural Poverty, paper presented at PEGNet Conference, Researchers Meet Practitioners,  Berlin, 
6-7 September, 2007. 
13 UNAIDS (2006): AIDS Epidemic Update 2006. UNAIDS, Geneva. 
14 H Epstein (2007) The Invisible Cure: Africa, the West, and the Fight Against AIDS, Farrar, Strauss and 
Giroux, New York 
15  T Barnett and A Whiteside, (2006), AIDS in the 21st Century: disease and globalisation, London and New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 5. 
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This paper takes a practical look at the association between HIV/AIDS and economies. Part 
1 assesses research suggesting a link and finds that, although there is some evidence that 
AIDS can affect economies, the correlation between economic status and HIV infection is 
not linear and varies between and within countries. This indicates factors other than wealth 
are important in explaining differential HIV prevalence, and in part 2 we look at the potential 
of happiness economics to explain infection rates. Unlike standard contemporary economic 
analysis, the study of happiness incorporates non-monetary values, and may therefore help 
fill some of the gaps in our understanding of HIV transmission.  
The study of hope is the subject of part 3 of the paper. This is an alternative way of looking 
at the problem. Hope is directly linked to the future inasmuch as it determines the value 
people place on that future. Those with high hopes in life and who place a high value on the 
future are likely to make different decisions and adopt different behaviours to those without 
long-term goals. In an adverse risk environment where life is unpredictable, the future is 
discounted.16  Individual and communal levels of hope may vary, with consequent impacts 
on HIV transmission. HIV/AIDS in turn may reduce hope and thereby reduce societies’ 
future well-being. 
In the final section, we outline some economic interventions for HIV/AIDS that are designed 
to strengthen hope and reduce transmission. We present four case studies where livelihood 
focused programmes have had positive impacts on health in general and HIV/AIDS in 
particular.  
One: Economics and HIV/AIDS: The Evidence 
The impact of AIDS on economies 
Thirty years into the epidemic, we are still not clear as to the effects of HIV/AIDS on macro-
economies and their constituent units.  The evidence points in both directions.17 Various 
methods have been used to test the macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS. The parameters 
measured include medical care costs, lost earnings, productivity effects and the impact of 
illness and premature death on savings and investment.  
An early study of 51 countries found that by 1992 HIV/AIDS had not had a statistically 
significant effect on per capita income growth since it emerged around 1980.18 Over (1992) 
found that economic growth in 30 African countries would be 0.56-1.47 per cent lower 
                                               
16 T Barnett and P Blaikie (1992) AIDS in Africa: its present and future impact, Belhaven London, chapter 8. 
17 For two careful analyses which arrive at very different conclusions, see:  C Bell, S Devarajan and H Gersbach 
(2004): Thinking About the Long-Run Economic Costs of AIDS. In M Haacker (ed.) (2004): The 
Macroeconomics of HIV/AIDS. Washington DC. International Monetary Fund;  A Young, (2005),The Gift of the 
Dying: The Tragedy of Aids and the Welfare of Future African Generations, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol 120 No 2, pp.  423-466; for an empirical study examining the complexities of outcomes in rural 
Africa, see: Yamano, T. & Jayne, T. S. (2004). Measuring the Impact of Working-Age Adult Mortality on Small 
Scale Farm Households in Kenya World Development, 32(1), 91-119.  
18 DE Bloom and A Mahal (1997): Does the AIDS Epidemic Threaten Economic Growth? Journal of 
Econometrics 77(1): 105-24. 
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because of the effect of the disease on the labour force and capital accumulation.19 A 
review of the literature by Barnett and Whiteside (2002) found that, “AIDS causes 
economies to grow more slowly,” and that, “the predicted order of magnitude has remained 
consistently in the range 0.5-1.0 per cent lower per year than in the absence of the disease. 
In no case has it been predicted that economies will actually contract. The impact on per 
capita incomes is uncertain.”20 
The impacts of AIDS on businesses are also far from clear. Low-level and long-term 
macroeconomic damage may have limited effects on the private sector by destabilising the 
business environment. Firms that pay for the health care and funeral costs of their 
employees will suffer direct economic losses if HIV/AIDS ravages the workforce. As 
workers fall sick and die, valuable knowledge and skills are lost, productivity declines, and 
companies need to invest in recruiting and training new staff.   
Not all companies will suffer. HIV/AIDS may benefit firms in some sectors, such as the 
pharmaceutical and funeral industries. Most firms in countries with very low HIV prevalence 
are unlikely to experience significant impacts. Even in hard-hit settings, many of which have 
a surplus of labour in the formal economy, firms with a high proportion of unskilled 
employees may find sick workers easier to replace than will those losing skilled staff, (some 
evidence suggests it is not the most educated senior managers who are most difficult to 
replace: rather it is the skilled artisans and craftspeople or individuals operating or 
maintaining critical pieces of machinery in integrated production processes21).  
Research on business impacts is limited to small-scale studies and a handful of surveys of 
business leaders’ opinions, of which some examples follow. The effect of the disease on 
the labour force appears to be increasing business costs for some firms in hard hit areas, 
albeit not to any great extent: 
 A 2002 study of six companies in South Africa and Botswana predicted that in each 
of the next ten years HIV/AIDS would impose additional costs of between 0.4 per 
cent and 5.9 per cent of the wage bill.22   
                                               
19 M Over (1992): Macroeconomic impact of AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa Technical Department, 
Population, Health, and Nutrition Division, Technical Working Paper No. 3 (Washington DC) (June). 
20 Tony Barnett and Alan Whiteside (2002): AIDS in the Twenty-First Century. Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 
289. 
21 M Haslwimmer, (1994). The Social and Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS on Nakambala Sugar Estate.  FAO, 
AGSP, January.  This report forms part of Barnett, T., 1994, The Effects Of HIV/AIDS On Farming Systems And 
Rural Livelihoods In Uganda, Tanzania And Zambia, A Summary Analysis of Case Studies from research carried 
out in the period July-September 1993, FAO Project  TSS/1 RAF/92/TO/A, Overseas Development Group, 
University of East Anglia for the FAO, Rome, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations; T Barnett, 
Tsetsele Fantan, Bekezela Mbakile and Alan Whiteside, (2002),  The private sector responds to the epidemic: 
Debswana - a global benchmark, UNAIDS, Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
 
22 S Rosen, J Simon, W MacLeod, M Fox, DM Thea, JR Vincent (2003): AIDS is Your Business. Harvard 
Business Review, Vol 81, No 1, February. 
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 In an annual World Economic Forum survey of over 10,000 business leaders 
worldwide, 24 per cent of respondents in 2006 reported that the virus was affecting 
business operations. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 62 per cent of businesses report 
impacts. 49 per cent of respondents expect impacts in the next five years.23 
 In a survey of 1,006 South African firms conducted by the South African Business 
Coalition on HIV/AIDS (SABCOHA), 24 per cent of respondents reported that 
recruitment and training costs had increased as a result of HIV/AIDS.24 
Households may also experience financial impacts. Those in which wage earners fall sick 
not only lose an income, they also have to cope with medical expenses and may forfeit 
additional income if family members have to take time off work to care for the sick. In the 
longer term, if investments in children’s schooling have to be diverted to AIDS care or if 
children leave school to look after ill relatives, households’ future prospects become 
bleaker. It becomes easier to fall into poverty and harder to escape. 
HIV/AIDS can place great pressure on household finances. One study in Zambia found that 
disposable income fell by over 80 per cent in two-thirds of the 333 AIDS-affected 
households studied. AIDS deaths, moreover, were linked to reduced household food 
consumption, with poor households suffering the most severe impacts.25 In rural Thailand, 
UNAIDS suggests that 15 per cent of families removed children from school after the 
disease hit,26 while recent survey based work on this topic in that country shows that AIDS 
has profound and complex effects on rural poverty.27 
Household studies have several limitations. Barnett and Whiteside (2002) observe that they 
are largely limited to rural African households and do not incorporate those that have 
already disappeared as a result of the epidemic.28 Moreover, most are based on small 
samples and do not take account of long-term effects on human capital development, or of 
the impact on inter-household relationships. It is possible, therefore, that some studies 
underestimate the damage caused.  But in addition to possible under-estimation of effect, 
recent rigorous work suggests the impact of HIV/AIDS-related mortality and morbidity on 
rural societies is more complex and multifaceted than was previously thought to be the 
case.29  In other words, HIV/AIDS does affect household welfare but the distribution of 
these effects between households in poor countries remains poorly understood. 
Economics and HIV/AIDS 
                                               
23 DE Bloom, L Reddy Bloom, M Weston (2007): HIV/AIDS and Business: A Growing Threat. World Economic 
Forum, Geneva, forthcoming. 
24 South African Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS: “The Impact of HIV/AIDS on Business in South Africa.” 
SABCOHA 2004 
25 N Nampanya-Serpell (2000): Social and Economic Risk Factors for HIV/AIDS Affected Families in Zambia. In 
International AIDS Economics Network AIDS and Economics Symposium, Durban, South Africa, July 7-8. 
26 UNAIDS (2000): Epidemiological Fact Sheet: Thailand. UNAIDS, Geneva. 
27 S Kongsin The Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS Morbidity on Households in Upper-North Thailand: Phayao 
case study (2001), PhD thesis, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. 
28 Barnett and Whiteside (2002) op. cit.: 191-2. 
29 Yamano, T. & Jayne, T. S. (2004): Measuring the Impact of Working-Age Adult Mortality on Small Scale Farm 
Households in Kenya World Development, 32(1), 91-119. 
 6 
There are several possible reasons why an individual’s economic status may affect the risk 
of HIV infection. In the early stages of the epidemic, it appeared that wealthy men were 
more susceptible, possibly due to their greater mobility and ability to pay for commercial 
sex. Botswana and South Africa have the highest HIV infection rates in Africa yet are 
among the continent’s richest countries. In the early stages of Brazil’s epidemic, moreover, 
people with secondary or tertiary schooling accounted for three-quarters of new 
infections.30  
As the epidemic progresses, however, there is evidence that the wealthy learn to protect 
themselves against the disease, which then becomes more prevalent among poorer 
populations. As Brazil’s epidemic matured in the 1990s, the proportion of infections 
accounted for by secondary- and tertiary-educated individuals fell from three-quarters to 
one-third.31 Salinas and Haacker (2006) found in studies in Ghana and Kenya that people 
just above the poverty line are most likely to be hit by HIV/AIDS, which renders them 
vulnerable to falling into poverty.32 Across countries, both high per capita incomes and low 
incidence of poverty are strongly correlated with reduced HIV prevalence.33  
It is difficult to ascertain the direction of these links, as it is likely that AIDS is causing as 
well as resulting from poverty. Many other infectious diseases, however, hit the poor 
hardest, and the intuitive case for a link from poverty to AIDS is strong. The poor often live 
in areas that are out of reach of health services, including services that provide information 
on diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Poor, uneducated women lack the power to insist that their 
partners use condoms, even when the latter can afford them. As we will see in part three, 
moreover, poor people’s reduced hope for the future may make them more likely to engage 
in behaviour that places them at risk of infection. 
Income inequality may also be important in determining HIV prevalence.34 Inequality has 
been found to influence overall health – for example, a classic study of the British civil 
service found that those male civil servants who had remained in the lower grades of the 
service had a mortality rate several times higher than those in senior positions, and that 
each level of the hierarchy had better health than the level below it.35 It may also influence 
AIDS. Income inequality at the national level can lead to increased migration, as rural 
workers move to cities or industrial centres. By disrupting families and communities and 
                                               
30 RG Parker (1998): Historic Overview of Brazil’s AIDS Programmes and Review of the World Bank AIDS 
Project. Arlington, VA: Family Health International/AIDSCAP.  
31 Parker (1998) op cit. 
32 Salinas, G. and Haacker, M. (2006): HIV/AIDS: The Impact on Poverty and Inequality. IMF Working Paper 
06/126. Washington. 
33 DE Bloom, River Path Associates, Jaypee Sevilla (2002): Health, Wealth, AIDS and Poverty. Asian 
Development Bank, September.  
34 Other forms of social inequality, which can in some circumstances become sexualised, are also likely to be 
important to prevalence. We discuss the impact of gender inequality in particular in section 4. See J Appleton, 
(2000), 'At my age I should be sitting under that tree': the impact of AIDS on Tanzanian lakeshore communities, 
Gender & Development, Volume 8, Issue 2 , pp 19 – 27; E Kissling, Allison EH, Seeley JA, Russell S, 
Bachmann M, Musgrave SD, Heck S.(2005) Fisherfolk are among groups most at risk of HIV: cross-country 
analysis of prevalence and numbers infected, AIDS, 18;19(17):1939-46. 
35 Marmot MG, Davey-Smith G, Stansfeld SA et al (1991): Health inequalities among British civil servants: the 
Whitehall II study. Lancet 337 1387-1393. 
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exposing men to sex workers, this can increase the risk of HIV transmission. Cross-country 
evidence suggests income inequality is correlated with HIV prevalence at a global level.36 
Summary 
The links between AIDS and the formal economy are complex. Severe economic damage 
appears to be limited to the household level, with the effect of the disease on per capita 
incomes unclear. The link in the opposite direction – from poverty to AIDS – is also far from 
clear-cut, although this may be growing stronger as the epidemic matures.  It is evident that 
factors other than wealth, including but not limited to income inequality, are important to 
HIV prevalence and it is likely that there are impacts of the disease, notably on social 
reproduction, which are not covered by traditional analysis. In the next two sections of the 
paper, we look at how different approaches shed a new light on the problem. 
Two: The Economics of Happiness 
The limits of traditional analysis 
Traditional economic analysis of HIV/AIDS focuses largely on the direct links between 
income and HIV infection. It does not generally address the wider set of circumstances in 
which decisions are made that put people at risk of HIV infection. Standard economic 
analysis of the disease’s impacts is also too limited. By looking only at the narrow economic 
effects in the short-term, it omits several factors that may ultimately have a much greater 
effect on societies and, indeed, economies.  
The first of these is non-market labour inputs. The value of women’s work, for example, is 
rarely taken into account, even when it can be measured economically by comparing it to 
similar work performed as a standard market transaction. Domestic work may be severely 
affected by HIV/AIDS but is not usually measured by economists.37  
The effect of the virus on communities is also difficult for economists to measure. Cost-
effectiveness and cost-benefit analyses, the most common tools for assessing the cost of 
HIV/AIDS in relation to the value of interventions to curtail it, look at the impact on 
individuals or households. They do not consider how entire communities can be damaged 
by the disease. The stigma surrounding the virus can leave certain sections of society 
ostracised, with negative impacts on social cohesion. The deaths of working-age people 
can leave communities without their leaders and problem-solvers, and the social capital 
that helps communities confront threats as a group is weakened.  
Linked to this is the effect on social reproduction. The latter refers to the way societies 
reproduce patterns – be they ideas, customs, social structures, or ways of interacting 
generally or working with others over generations. The morbidity and mortality resulting 
                                               
36 Bloom et al (2002) op cit. 
37 N Folbre, (2001), The Invisible Heart: Economics and Family Values. The New Press, New York.; Folbre, N. 
& Bittman, M., (2004), Family Time: the social organization of care. Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 
London and New York. 
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from HIV/AIDS can adversely affect these processes. The death of a mother or father, or 
both, means many of life’s lessons may not be passed on to children. If that mother or 
father is also an active member of a community (or a country) and its key institutions,38 the 
impacts will spread widely throughout society as a whole.39 Very little is known about the 
effects of AIDS on the non-formal, non-monetised economy of social reproduction. 
However, limited research suggests some of the greatest and longer-term effects of the 
epidemic may be found here.40  
Long-term costs such as these are rarely included in traditional analysis of the impacts of 
HIV/AIDS. Economics cannot fully explain HIV prevalence, and it cannot cover the entirety 
of the pathogen’s effects. Studies of the economics of happiness have garnered increasing 
attention in recent years and this new approach may help fill some of the gaps in our 
understanding of HIV/AIDS.   
The study of happiness 
In the last few centuries, governments across the world have placed enormous emphasis 
on improving incomes as a means to promote well-being. Many have had great success in 
making their countries richer, but people’s sense of well-being has not kept pace with 
economic advances. In the United States, for example, where average incomes have more 
than doubled in the past 50 years, self-reported happiness levels have risen only very 
slightly, and the proportion of people who report being “very happy” has remained steady. 
In Britain, Japan and continental Europe the story is similar.41 Beyond a certain income 
level, increased wealth appears to have only very small impacts on well-being and other 
things become more important.  
The economist Richard Layard has described happiness as “our overall motivational 
device”. Those things that make us happy, he argues – such as sex, food and love – are 
vital to our survival as a species. Conversely, that which makes us unhappy often poses 
dangers.42 Others have pointed to the role of happiness as a factor in human evolution.43 
Happiness may also be important to the struggle against HIV/AIDS. Happiness is 
associated with improved physical health and a greater ability to recover from illness. 
Depression, on the other hand, weakens the immune system, thus potentially increasing 
vulnerability to infections.44 Richard Layard has identified seven factors that are key to 
happiness: “our family relationships, our financial situation, our work, our community and 
                                               
38 P Strand, K Matlosa, A Strode, K Chirambo, HIV/AIDS and Democratic Governance in South Africa: 
Illustrating the Impact on Electoral Processes (2005) Institute for Democracy in South Africa, Pretoria, South 
Africa. 
39 N Nattrass (2004) The Moral Economy of AIDS in South Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 
40 Mujuru-Mvere, N. N. (2004). Rural women’s increasing subordination due to HIV/AIDS in eastern Zimbabwe, 
unpublished doctoral dissertation, School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia. Norwich,  UK; 
Barnett, T., The Cost of an HIV/AIDS epidemic, Tropical Medicine and International Health, March 2004, Vol 9 
No. 3, 315-7; Barnett, T., The Cost of an HIV/AIDS epidemic, Tropical Medicine and International Health, March 
2004, Vol 9 No. 3, 315-7 
41 R Layard (2005): Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. Penguin Books. London: 29-31. 
42 ibid: 24 
43 Nettle, D. (2005). Happiness: The science behind your smile. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
44 Layard, op. cit., p. 19 
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friends, our health, our personal freedom and our personal values.”45 The relative 
importance of these and other factors, of course, may differ between cultures, but all of 
them may influence susceptibility to infection, and HIV/AIDS in turn may have impacts on 
each. 
Governments’ focus on income growth may have negative repercussions for efforts to 
tackle the virus. If prevention and treatment interventions are targeted, for example, at the 
poor with no consideration of the differing risk environments they inhabit, resources will be 
squandered on people who are not at high risk of infection. Ignoring people in wealthier 
communities may also prove costly, as South Africa and Botswana have shown. 
Addressing only the economic impacts of the disease, meanwhile, fails to take account of 
many important aspects of well-being and leaves societies open to potential but as yet 
poorly understood long-term effects on social cohesion and reproduction.  
Although happiness offers a broader perspective than economic analysis of the impacts of 
and risk factors for HIV/AIDS, measuring happiness is difficult. Surveys of self-reported 
happiness between and within countries may suffer from language issues, for example, as 
the word is understood to mean different things by different cultures. Monitoring brain 
activity to identify levels of happiness, meanwhile, is costly and impractical for large-scale 
studies. HIV/AIDS, moreover, is a long wave epidemic whose first effects are felt several 
years after infection and where long-term impacts are poorly understood.46 The desire to 
avoid infection therefore requires people to value the future enough to adjust their current 
behaviour. Happiness can obviously make us place a greater value on life, but hope, the 
subject of the next part of this paper, provides a stronger link with the future.  
Three: The Role of Hope 
Hope and HIV infection 
In times of rapid and/or extended social, cultural and economic disruption, social 
distinctions, roles, relationships and responsibilities are confused and fluid: people do not 
have a clear view of the future.  Their ability to hope is severely compromised as they are 
unable to plan in relation to an extended time horizon.  Richard Layard, who has had a 
major impact in raising the profile of the study of happiness, has also acknowledged the 
importance to well-being of hope. “We could not be happy without setting ourselves goals,” 
he asserts. “Prod any happy person and you will find a project.”47 
To have such goals, of course, you need hope. Hope is not just about optimism for the 
future, but also about making and enacting realistic plans to attain future objectives. Snyder 
(1996) has defined hope as, “goal-directed thinking in which the person appraises his or her 
                                               
45 ibid: 63. 
46 Bell, Clive, Bruhns, Ramona and Gersbach, Hans, "Economic Growth, Education, and AIDS in Kenya: A 
Long-Run Analysis" (October 1, 2006). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4025 Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=935174 
47 Layard, op. cit. p. 73 
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perceived capability to produce workable routes to goals…as well as the potential to initiate 
and sustain movement along the pathways.”48  
Hope for the future can therefore have strong impacts on behaviour in the present. Snyder 
et al (1991) explain, “The person who is hopeful or envisions the possibility of a positive 
future is more apt to engage in activities directed towards that future…In contrast, those 
persons who have no hope and view the future negatively are less apt to engage in positive 
behaviour.”49  
The effects of hope on behaviour can have long-lasting repercussions for well-being.50 A 
study comparing children’s answers to a series of questions about their hopes for the future 
with their subsequent scores in a basic skills test found a significant positive correlation 
between high hopes for the future and high test scores.51 Hope also appears to affect 
health. The unemployed experience higher levels of mental distress than the employed, 
regardless of wealth, possibly because of an absence of hope.52 Laboratory evidence 
suggests that goal-directed thinking increases self-esteem and reduces emotions related to 
depression.53 The civil servants studied by Marmot et al (1991) (who were certainly not 
desperately poor) were in a position of relatively low income and low esteem where they 
had lost hope of advancement to higher levels. It was this position, with advancement in 
sight but always impossible, which negatively affected their health.54  Transferring this 
insight to a very different environment, in poor countries, those who are desperately poor 
cope, and sometimes die of poverty.  In contrast, those who are just above the poverty line, 
particularly poor women, may aspire, usually fail and therefore experience hopelessness. It 
is this structural position which exposes them to individual risk. 
The hope environment can influence HIV/AIDS prevalence. People with hope for the future 
and plans for achieving future goals are less likely to engage in activities that put them at 
risk of illness or death in the present.  In the case of HIV, such behaviours include injecting 
drug use or risky sexual behaviours. Behaviour change messages are likely to be more 
effective if those receiving them have hope for the future. Those without hope, by contrast, 
place a low value on the future. Without future goals, there is little reason to avoid actions 
that may cause harm in the future but do not do so in the present. People may therefore 
forfeit future gains in favour of present benefits. Despite the risks involved, for example 
women facing a daily survival struggle may be forced to exchange sexual favours (possibly 
without protection) for the economic assistance they and their families need to make it 
through the week. Men who lack hope for the future may be unwilling to surrender 
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immediate pleasure in return for a far-off future benefit by wearing a condom. People 
already sick with AIDS may be less likely to adhere to antiretroviral therapy (ART) if they 
have little to live for, thus risking passing on the virus to others.55 And the hope engendered 
by the availability of ART is likely to encourage people who would previously have seen no 
benefit to present for HIV counselling and testing. Testing has been shown to reduce risky 
behaviour in those who test positive, and this may reduce transmission. 
There has been little research on the link from hope to HIV/AIDS, but there is one 
outstanding example suggesting the concept’s relevance  The chaos and terror of Idi 
Amin’s rule in Uganda in the 1970s sharply increased social and economic inequality, 
particularly between men and women, forced many to discount the future and instead focus 
on day-to-day survival. Disruption of hope may well have contributed to the spread of HIV in 
the region. A thriving black market grew up to replace the economic system Amin had 
destroyed, and cross-border smuggling organised by men was rife.56 Transport routes are 
notoriously fertile ground for HIV infection, as traders and truckers spend long periods away 
from home, sometimes frequenting the bars and brothels that spring up to service them. 
Gender relations were upended as the men involved in smuggling became wealthier 
compared to women, and women’s dependency on men grew, possibly most among those  
“not so poor” women with some education whose aspirations were most acutely 
frustrated57. This imbalance “inevitably took on a sexual complexion.”58 The risk 
environment was made still more precarious when in 1979 the Tanzanian army crossed the 
border and overthrew Amin, passing along the same transport routes. Rakai district near 
the Tanzanian border, where both soldiers and traders spent extended periods, was the 
site of Africa’s first reported cases of HIV/AIDS in 1982. Infection thereafter spread rapidly 
through Rakai and neighbouring areas.59   
Clearly, more research is needed to determine the strength of the links from hope to HIV 
infection. Hope will not explain infection in all population groups – the early infections 
among men who have sex with men in the US, for example, often occurred amid thriving, 
energetic communities. It does, however, offer a possible explanation for the links between 
environment and risk behaviour,60 with important implications for policy. Hope is quite 
straightforward to measure via questionnaires, and it is a concept that individuals, 
communities and policy-makers can understand and researchers investigate.  
                                               
55 S Bernays, T Rhodes, T Barnett (2007 forthcoming) Hope: a new way to look at the HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 
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56 T Barnett and P Blaikie, op. cit. 
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study, International Journal of STD & AIDS, Volume 10, Number 7, 1 July 1999 , pp. 452-459 (8) 
58 Barnett and Whiteside, op. cit., 135 
59 E Hooper (1999): The River: A Journey back to the Source of HIV and AIDS. London: Allen Lane/Penguin 
Press; D Serwadda, N Sewankambo, A Lwegaba, J Carswell et al (1985): Slim Disease: A New Disease in 
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Snyder and his co-authors (1991, 1997) developed separate “hope scales” to assess levels 
of hope in children and adults.61 Both include questions measuring what Snyder calls 
“pathways thinking” (that is, the ability to devise paths towards future goals) and “agency” 
(the ability to initiate practical actions that help one embark on these paths). Snyder has 
validated these scales in a United States setting that does not relate to HIV/AIDS. He found 
that the agency and pathways measures were closely correlated and remained quite stable 
when re-tested. It will be important to validate similar scales in a developing-world setting. 
Measures on the children’s hope scale, with multiple choice answers ranging from “none of 
the time” to “all of the time”, were as follows: 
1. I think I am doing pretty well. 
2. I can think of many ways to get the things in life that are most important to me. 
3. I am doing just as well as other kids my age. 
4. When I have a problem, I can come up with lots of ways to solve it. 
5. I think the things I have done in the past will help me in the future. 
6. Even when I want others to quit, I know that I can find ways to solve the problem. 
Measures, 1, 3 and 5 relate to agency, and measures 2, 4 and 6 to pathways thinking. 
Once levels of hope have been identified, it may then be possible to find out why some 
people lack hope. Establishing the obstacles to future-directed thinking and actions will help 
policy-makers clear a path to the future, with potentially beneficial impacts on many aspects 
of quality of life.  
In an HIV/AIDS context, surveys of hope may help pinpoint the groups most vulnerable to 
infection, which can then be targeted with prevention and treatment efforts. The association 
with hope also implies that a broader approach to HIV prevention is needed – one which 
addresses the wide range of structural/contextual factors that promote or reduce hope. At 
present, most interventions aimed at preventing HIV infection attempt to alter individual 
behaviour, such as promotion of condom use and abstinence. Such interventions operate 
on the clinical dose-response model.  They rarely take account of the broader, structural 
factors that determine such behaviours. As we have discussed, hope is likely to play a key 
role in influencing risk decisions, and whether or not one has hope depends on a range of 
factors, including but not limited to those listed by Layard above. Importantly, individuals 
and communities themselves can easily identify impediments to hope and thereby engage 
in the improvement of their health and their societies.  
Clearly, many governments in poor countries where AIDS is a problem are already working 
to improve structural conditions – poverty reduction, transport and communication 
improvements, water and sanitation, and education, for example, are worthwhile goals with 
or without HIV/AIDS. This raises the question of how those working to tackle HIV/AIDS can 
                                               
61 Snyder et al (1991) op cit; Snyder et al (1997) op cit 
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add value in influencing the broader environment, particularly given that their resources are 
limited and that some of those resources will continue to be directed at individual behaviour 
change efforts.  
Some structural changes can have negative impacts on HIV/AIDS. Improving transportation 
links, for example, allows for greater mobility, which can be a risk factor for infection. 
Poverty reduction, too, gives people a larger disposable income and may enable them to 
afford to visit sex workers. These changes may also have positive effects, of course, as 
increased wealth is generally associated with improved health. It may be that those tackling 
HIV/AIDS could influence policy-makers to consider the potential negative side effects of 
structural changes on HIV transmission. Structural factors such as improved gender 
relations, women’s education, reduced discrimination against sexual minorities and health 
system reform are also likely candidates for those working on HIV to advocate for. More 
research is needed in order to establish where the latter can have greatest value – 
determining an optimal balance between individual and structural interventions, and 
determining which structural areas to target are complex questions that have so far 
received little attention. It may be that a focus on hope as a bridge between structural 
conditions and individual behaviour will help to address some of these issues, particularly if 
it is recognised that “poverty reduction” may indeed remove significant population fractions 
from “poverty” (however defined) while accommodating increased inequality which 
frustrates hope and aspiration.62  
The impact of HIV/AIDS on hope 
Many factors influence hope. Security, economic circumstances, the work environment, and 
family and community cohesion are some of the most obvious. Health is another. HIV/AIDS 
can destroy hope, resulting in vicious spirals that damage societies and lead to further HIV 
infections. 
In an environment where HIV/AIDS makes long-term prospects precarious, the incentives 
to save are reduced, leaving families less secure financially and societies with fewer 
resources for investment in economic activities. Motivation to invest may also decline. 
Freire (2000) has estimated that saving as a proportion of GDP in South Africa will fall by 
14 per cent by 2010 as a result of HIV/AIDS.63  
                                               
62 Uganda between 1992 and 2006 is a case in point.  Official “poverty reduction” has doubtless been dramatic. 
The proportion of the population living below the poverty line declined from: 56% in 1992 to 44% in 1997, to 
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these achievements, there is evidence of increased inequality. Consumption gains have been inequitably 
distributed, Thus, the richest decile has experienced the largest rise in living standards - real consumption 
increased by 20% since 1997, whereas consumption of poorest decile grew by only 8% over the same period.  
 
63 S Freire (2002): Impact of AIDS on Saving Behaviour in South Africa. Paper presented at the IAEN 
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AIDS mortality and morbidity may also discourage families from investing in human 
capital.64 If the disease diminishes parents’ hope that their children will reach adulthood, 
spending scant resources on their education will become less attractive, with long-term 
negative effects on children’s life prospects. Birdsall and Hamoudi (2004) have found that 
lower parental life expectancy is associated with reduced primary school enrolment and 
fewer years of schooling.65 Parents may also decide to have more children to compensate 
for the higher risk of a child dying, meaning resources have to be spread more thinly 
between children, thereby reducing the education and health care received by each child.  
Perhaps the greatest impact of AIDS on hope and the prospects of setting and achieving 
goals is felt by orphans. Bell, Devarajan and Gersbach (2004) have forecast that by 2010 
19 per cent of South African children will have lost both parents. Just 29 per cent will have 
both parents surviving.66 Children orphaned by AIDS suffer higher rates of depression than 
other children and have lower self-esteem.67 As well as the emotional damage which 
makes people less likely to formulate goals, orphans also lack the means to achieve their 
objectives. Human capital among orphans is weaker than among non-orphans. A study in 
Indonesia found orphans less prepared for life,68 while a detailed ethnographic study of 
orphaned children in Botswana demonstrates the multiple disabling traumas experienced 
by orphans of the epidemic in that country.69 
From a policy point of view, families affected by AIDS may need more persuading than 
others to continue to save and invest in their children’s education. Financial incentives may 
be required in these circumstances. A strong focus on orphans is also urgently needed. 
The psychological trauma experienced by AIDS orphans can compromise their hope for the 
future and imperil their subsequent integration into society. Counselling and treatment could 
help limit these impacts, and orphans will also need assistance in mapping out and working 
towards goals.  
Four: Economic Interventions for HIV/AIDS 
Existing interventions to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS emphasise individual behaviour. The 
ABC approach to prevention (“Abstain, Be faithful, Condomise”), for example, encourages 
people to alter their sexual practices.70 Antiretroviral therapy requires individuals to follow 
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strict dosage routines. These measures require that people have hope for the future and 
goals to aim for. They do not by themselves alter the structural environment that 
strengthens hope, so their long-term benefits are likely to be limited unless they are 
complemented by interventions with broader aims.  
One of the factors likely to influence hope is wealth, or the possibility of achieving it. There 
is an extensive literature showing how economic incentives can contribute to improvements 
in other areas of health, such as drug dependency or alcoholism. In the United States, for 
example, contingency management approaches to treating stimulant abusers, which 
provide money to cocaine and methamphetamine users in return for regular clean urine 
samples, have been found to reduce stimulant use.71 Some drug users have reported that 
having something to strive for and being successful and receiving a reward for it – an 
unusual experience for many of them - was a key influence on their decisions about 
whether to use drugs during the study period. Similar research in the area of HIV/AIDS is 
more limited, but here we present four case studies showing the positive impact of 
economic interventions.  
The IMAGE study, South Africa72 
The Intervention with Microfinance for AIDS and Gender Equity (IMAGE) study in South 
Africa assessed how an economic intervention can reduce HIV transmission by unblocking 
a path towards future goals. This study adds to what is at present a very thin literature on 
how microfinance can reduce HIV transmission.73 
Intimate-partner violence is an important risk factor for HIV, and one in four South African 
women reports being a victim of such violence.74 The IMAGE study, a randomised 
controlled trial that ran from June 2001 to March 2005, assessed the impact on the risk 
environment of a microfinance scheme that also included gender and HIV training. 
Microfinance has been a boom industry in the developing world in recent years, with 
millions of poor families given both hope of a better future and a means to achieve their 
goals. Women in particular have benefited from such schemes.75  
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The IMAGE programme was targeted at poor women in South Africa’s rural Limpopo 
province, an area much affected by male labour migration to South Africa’s industrial 
heartland. The scheme involved small loans combined with participatory learning activities 
which women attended every two weeks. Loans were used mainly for retail or tailoring 
businesses.76 
The impacts on hope were substantial. Ninety per cent of women in the intervention group 
reported that the programme had significantly improved their lives. Women enrolled in the 
programme were more likely to participate in social groups and collective action, and felt a 
greater sense of community solidarity during crises.77 
The increased hope led to some improvements in health. Although there was no effect on 
HIV incidence or unprotected sex, intimate-partner violence decreased by 55 per cent in the 
intervention group relative to the control group over a two-year period.78 It may be that the 
changes in the hope environment will eventually have effects on HIV transmission, although 
this is as yet uncertain as such effects could be expected to become evident over a period 
longer than that of the research project. 
South African pensions and health79 
A pension system has existed in South Africa for many decades, albeit with unequal 
payments between different ethnic groups. After the end of the apartheid government, there 
was a dramatic increase in the public pension paid to the African, Indian and Coloured 
elderly. In a very short period,80 the number of public pension recipients increased from 
50,000 to over 1.5 million South Africans. From the perspective of most families in South 
Africa, this pension represents a sizable amount of money. It is more than double the 
median income per capita of black South Africans. With the expansion of the pension 
system, there was - almost overnight - a dramatic change in the economic resources 
available to a very large number of South African households. This offered poor households 
in particular greater economic security and the possibility of investing in goal-directed 
activities. 
Case (2001) measured the impact of the pension on household health status. In 
households that pooled their income, pensions protected the health of household members 
by maintaining nutrition, improving living conditions and reducing stress. Having a 
pensioner who shared his or her funds with the household was associated with an increase 
in children’s height - a robust indicator of subsequent health; a reduced likelihood of adults 
skipping meals; and lower rates of depression.81 It is not clear whether the program 
strengthened hope, but its impact on reducing depression suggests it may have been one 
of the channels via which it improved health. 
                                               
76 Pronyk et al (2006) op cit: 1973. 
77 ibid: 1979. 
78 ibid: 1981. 
79 Anne Case (2001): Does Money Protect Health Status? Evidence from South African Pensions. NBER 
Working Paper 8495, Cambridge, MA, October. 
80 We are grateful to Alan Whiteside for drawing our attention to the sudden nature of this change and its 
implications. 
81 ibid 
 17 
The Child Support Grant, South Africa82 
First implemented in 1998, South Africa’s Child Support Grant (CSG) aims to assist very 
poor households in bringing up children. After passing a means test, families received R100 
per month (the sum has since increased) for each child below the age of seven. On 
average the grant makes up one-third of a recipient household’s income, so it clearly has 
potential to reduce stress and increase a family’s investment in the human capital of its 
children.83  
Seventy-nine per cent of recipients reported that the grant had made it easier to look after 
their children.84 Further cost-effectiveness analysis indicates that orphan support in South 
African communities is most effectively implemented when underpinned by welfare 
grants.85 A study in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, meanwhile, found that poor children 
receiving the CSG were significantly more likely to be enrolled in school at the ages of six 
and seven than their siblings who were too old to benefit from it.86 Education has a strong 
association with improved health, so it is possible that the CSG will have some health 
impact. Whether this will extend to reduced HIV transmission or stronger adherence to 
AIDS treatment is not yet known, however.87   
The PROGRESA programme, Mexico88 
Mexico’s PROGRESA scheme, which provides economic assistance to poor families if they 
participate in health programmes, adopts a similar approach to the IMAGE project 
described above. Its main aim is to improve child health and education, but it has also had 
positive effects on adults. 
In order to receive cash transfers, families had to make regular preventive health care 
visits, including prenatal care for mothers, immunization for young children and preventive 
checkups for adults. Young children and pregnant and lactating women had to take regular 
nutritional supplements, and adults had to attend education programmes covering health, 
hygiene and nutrition.89 
The results of a two-year randomised controlled trial suggest the programme had strong 
positive impacts on health. The incidence of illness among children in the programme was 
reduced by 23 per cent and their height – an indicator of health status - increased by 1-4 
per cent.90 The daily activities of adults enrolled in PROGRESA were significantly less likely 
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to be impeded by illness than those of un-enrolled adults. The programme also improved 
the health of those aged 50 or over. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
We have seen that the relationship between economic structures and processes and the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic still remains poorly understood thirty years into the epidemic.91  What is 
also clear but less frequently stated is that efforts to achieve effective behavioural change 
have had mixed results, and in many countries have largely failed.  A major flaw in many of 
these efforts has been the assumption that necessary changes in sexual behaviours are 
individual responses to “doses” of prevention interventions. In fact, increasing evidence 
suggests that behavioural changes cannot be dissociated from their social, economic and 
cultural contexts, which may govern whether any such dose is effective.92  
In recent years, some donors have begun to acknowledge the importance of these contexts 
and of “structural interventions” to alter them. This new line of thinking recognises that while 
it is not clear that HIV epidemics are directly caused by poverty, they are closely related to 
the complex and diverse social, economic and cultural inequalities found in human 
societies.  While behaviour change assumes mainly individual responsibility and action as 
risk behaviours, structural interventions assume that the environment regulates the risk 
faced by individuals. It is environments that are risky, not merely individuals’ behaviours.    
We can briefly summarise the recommendations of this paper as follows: 
Policy Recommendations 
From the perspective of policy strategy, we should move away from simplistic perspectives 
focused on individual behaviour change and recognise that the environments within which 
transmission and effects occur must be taken into account.  Continuing to act as though 
these environments are immune to interventions is costly. We have argued that a key 
component in creating a risk environment is the relative absence of hope for large numbers 
of people. Where people have little hope and little aspiration, they discount the longer-term 
future and take risks to survive in the present and very near future.  That may be a 
significant variable in the epidemiological processes we are seeing in the case of the rapid 
and wide spread of HIV in Africa and other poor and disrupted regions of the world.  
Structural interventions may be an important way of introducing hope into the lives of those 
who currently can expect little. Security, stability, expectations of seeing the birth of 
grandchildren and their coming to adulthood, expectations of seeing a small enterprise 
grow bigger or a tree crop plantation come to maturity - these are all signs and indicators of 
hope that can have vital impacts on decisions and behaviours. In the longer term, creating 
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and agitating for conditions such as these for more people is crucial if hope is to be raised 
as a weapon against HIV/AIDS. 
Programmatic Recommendations 
Considered programmatically, there are two inter-related strategic paths.  Programmatic 
interventions most amenable to immediate funding and returns to investment in the medium 
term are those that extend the realistic aspirational decision horizons of individuals and 
communities.93 We do not yet have a great deal of experience in developing programmes 
for structural interventions. However, welfare support systems of various kinds, ranging 
from cash support (as in the case of pensions and child support schemes) are undoubtedly 
one type of intervention that may serve to increase hope.  Microfinance and assertiveness 
and gender training targeted in particular at women may also be potentially useful 
interventions.  
In each case, these programmes seek to increase hope, extend personal and communal 
planning horizons and thus add value to the future in circumstances where otherwise 
people have every reason to discount it. It is important, however, to ensure that these and 
similar economic interventions reach those who need them, and that their effectiveness in 
strengthening hope and reducing HIV transmission is monitored on a long-term basis. In 
resource-constrained environments such as are found in many areas affected by AIDS, 
risks that uptake of such programs will be limited to those not at risk of infection, or to those 
with high education levels and therefore awareness of programmes’ existence, must be 
factored in to programme design.   
Research Recommendations 
We need to know much more about the social and economic distributional effects of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in poor countries.94 We also need to understand more about the role of 
differential hope in combination with social and economic inequalities in shaping diverse 
HIV epidemics around the world.95 Studies measuring levels of hope and comparing them 
to HIV prevalence will provide some indicator of the strength of the link between the two 
without being able to pinpoint causality. Studies asking individuals about the role of hope in 
influencing their sexual behaviour may also produce interesting results.  
Much more research is also needed to assess the impact of structural interventions on HIV 
transmission. The four cases we have presented offer some promise, but if economic 
programmes are to become a mainstay of HIV prevention, many more such studies will be 
necessary. Questions also remain as to how far those working on AIDS should go in 
advocating for broad structural changes, given that many governments are endeavouring to 
implement these changes anyway and that the resources available for HIV/AIDS activists 
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are limited. Finding areas where an HIV/AIDS perspective on broad structural change can 
add value will be vital, and decisions about the proportion of resources and energy that 
should be devoted to structural interventions versus behavioural change programmes will 
require a solid evidence base.  
 
 
 
 
